FILED
FEB 4 19
MICHAEL RODAK, JR.,

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1976

NO. 75-1108

JERRY JAMES BORDEAUX,

Petitioner,

-vs-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Patrick J. Briggs, Esq.
HARRINGTON, WADDELL & BRIGGS
520 West Ash, Suite 300
San Diego, California 92101
(714) 238-1355

Attorneys for Petitioner

BLEED THROUGH

I N D E X

	Page
Table of Cases	iii
Opinion Below	2
Jurisdiction	2
Questions Presented for Review	2
Constitutional Provisions Involved	3
Statement of the Case	3
Statement of the Facts	5
Reasons for Granting the Writ	10
I. The affirmation of a stop and detention based upon less than a "founded suspicion" is offensive to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and previous Supreme Court decisions.	10
II. The stop and search of petitioner's vehicle cannot be justified as a valid border search and therefore is not within one of the delineated exceptions to the probable cause or warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.	12

BLEED THROUGH

III. The evidence presented in the instant case was insufficient to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner possessed marijuana with intent to distribute. 16

Conclusion 19

Appendix A - Order Affirming

Appendix B - Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Request for Hearing in Banc



BLEED THROUGH

TABLE OF CASES

Cases	Page
Alexander v. U.S., 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir., 1966)	15
Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 266 (1973)	14,15
Arnellanes v. U.S., 302 F.2d 603 (9th Cir., 1962)	17
Bettis v. U.S., 408 F.2d 563 (9th Cir., 1969)	17
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)	13
Corngold v. U.S., 376 F.2d 1 (9th Cir., 1966)	13,14
Doherty v. U.S., 381 F.2d 719 (9th Cir., 1963)	17
Evans v. U.S., 257 F.2d 121, 126 (9th Cir., 1958)	18
Gonzales v. U.S., 301 F.2d 31 (9th Cir., 1962)	17
Henry v. U.S., 361 U.S. 98 (1959).	10,12
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347-357 (1967)	13
Ong Way Jong v. U.S., 245 F.2d 392 (9th Cir., 1957)	18



BLEED THROUGH

People v. Henze, 253 C.App.2d 986 (1967) 10

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967) . 10

U.S. v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir., 1974) 14

U.S. v. Gardner, 475 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir., 1973) 17

U.S. v. Jackson, 423 F.2d 506 (9th Cir., 1970) 15

U.S. v. Lacefield, 468 F.2d 170 (9th Cir., 1972) 17

U.S. v. Majourau, 474 F.2d 766 (9th Cir., 1973) 12,15

U.S. v. Markham, 440 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir., 1970) 15

U.S. v. Martin, 483 F.2d 974 (9th Cir., 1974) 18

U.S. v. Thomas, 453 F.2d 141 (9th Cir., 1971) 17

U.S. v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229, 235 (9th Cir., 1973) 10

U.S. v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir., 1970) 15

U.S. v. Williams, 459 F.2d 44 (9th Cir., 1972) 11

Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir., 1966) 10



BLEED THROUGH

Other Authorities:

U.S. Constitution Amendment IV . . 3

Statutes:

28 USC 1254(1) 2

21 USC 841(a)(1) 3,16

18 USC 420 8(a)(2) 4

21 USC 841(b)(1)(B). 4

19 USC 1581(a) 13

Other Authorities:

U.S. Constitution Amendment IV . . 3

Statutes:

28 USC 1254(1) 2

21 USC 841(a)(1) 3,16

18 USC 420 8(a)(2) 4

21 USC 841(b)(1)(B). 4

19 USC 1581(a) 13



BLEED THROUGH

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

NO._____

JERRY JAMES BORDEAUX,

Petitioner,

-vs-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner, Jerry James Bordeaux, respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered November 12, 1975, rehearing and request for hearing in banc denied, January 7, 1976.

BLEED THROUGH

OPINION BELOW

The Court of Appeals entered its unpublished memorandum decision No. 75-2291, on November 12, 1975. A copy of the opinion is attached as Appendix A. Petition for Rehearing and Request for Hearing in Banc were denied on January 7, 1976. A copy of the order denying the petition for rehearing and request for hearing in banc is attached as Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

On November 12, 1975, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (Appendix A). Rehearing and request for hearing in banc were denied on January 7, 1976. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under Title 28, United States Code, Section 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Was the information known by U.S. Customs agents at the time of their detention and arrest of petitioner sufficient to constitute "founded suspicion" or probable cause to justify such action?

II. Can the detention and search of the boat be justified as a valid border search where the U.S. Customs agents had no information that petitioner's boat or any of the co-defendants had left the territorial limits of the United States?

BLEED THROUGH

III. Was the evidence presented sufficient to support the finding of petitioner's guilt where customs agents observed him merely driving a truck and trailer to San Diego Bay whereupon two co-defendants loaded a boat onto the trailer which was subsequently found to contain contraband?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment IV:

> "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from an affirmation of a judgment of conviction by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of petitioner Jerry James Bordeaux for possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1).

On August 14, 1974, the Grand Jury for the Southern District of California

BLEED THROUGH

returned a four count indictment against petitioner Bordeaux and two co-defendants.

On October 21, 1974, petitioner filed his motion to suppress evidence as having been seized without probable cause, (Clerk's Record, hereinafter C.R., p. 10-14), with the government filing its motions in opposition on November 4, 1974 (C.R., 16-19).

On November 18, 1974, after receiving sworn testimony and arguments by counsel in support and opposition of the motion to suppress, the Court denied said motion. (C.R., 20)

Following petitioner's execution of a "Waiver of Trial by Jury and Waiver of Special Findings of Fact" on March 11, 1975, the various parties agreed to proceed by way of a stipulated facts trial. (C.R., 22-23) Stipulations as to the nature of the contraband (marijuana) and the chain of custody were entered into, as well as stipulations that the court could consider the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress.

On March 11, 1975, the court found petitioner Bordeaux guilty of Count Four as set forth above and later sentenced him to the custody of the Attorney General for a period of three years pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4208(a)(2). Additionally, a five year term of special parole was prescribed under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B). (C.R., 24) Petitioner filed notice of appeal on May 19, 1975, and was allowed

BLEED THROUGH

to remain at liberty on the original bond.

On November 12, 1975, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the petitioner's conviction (Appendix A) and on January 7, 1976, denied petitioner's Petition for Rehearing and Request for Hearing in Banc (Appendix B).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On the 26th of July, 1974, Agent Clyde Burnett of U.S. Customs, CPO Unit, San Diego, California, was on duty in the area of Shelter Island in San Diego Bay. At this time, he noticed a boat being launched into the water with one occupant aboard. The boat's trailer and towing vehicle, a Chevrolet Blazer, then went to one of the nearby marinas and picked up the driver of the boat rather than leaving Shelter Island. (Reporter's Transcript, hereinafter R.T., p.6, 1.6) Agent Burnett testified that the two men were in their middle and late twenties (R.T., p. 10, 1.6). Petitioner Bordeaux was 35 years old, his date of birth being March 1, 1939.

Agent Burnett never saw the boat taken out of the water, but had seen it launched on other occasions. (R.T., p. 6, 1. 20) Agent Burnett's workday was from 8:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. (R.T., p. 34, 1. 11) A check of the boat registration number revealed it was registered to petitioner Bordeaux, (R.T., p. 8, 1. 3 and p. 9, 1. 25) who resided at 925 South Magnolia,

BLEED THROUGH

El Cajon, California (R.T., p. 36, l. 8). The towing vehicle was also registered at the same address, to Willford and Elizabeth Bordeaux (R.T., p. 35, l. 5).

The boat was described as a high speed open boat with an inboard engine and outboard drive (R.T., p. 10, l. 9 and l. 12) registered on July 19, 1974 (R.T., p. 29, l. 1) one week before Agent Burnett's initial observation. The boat had a slip rented by the month at the Voyager Marina in San Diego Bay (R.T., p. 7, l. 11).

Agent Burnett subsequently inspected the boat in its berth at the Marina (R.T., p. 10, l. 25), and described it as a new boat (R.T., p. 27, l. 9). There was no contraband seen on or near the boat (R.T., p. 28, l. 4). There was nothing unusual about the boat (R.T., p. 28, l. 7). There had been no alterations or modifications to enable the boat to carry contraband (R.T., p. 28, l. 11). Agent Burnett observed nothing suspicious about the boat except that it was very clean (R.T., p. 28, l. 17). He further testified that it was not unusual to keep a new boat clean (R.T., p. 28, l. 22). Agent Burnett further testified that it is necessary to have a new boat taken out of the water to have it serviced on a regular basis.

The name "Bordeaux" was run in the computer and came back a "hit" (R.T., p. 8, l. 14) indicating that he had been involved in an Arizona case (R.T., p. 9, l. 1) which was adjudicated as a misdemeanor. (R.T., p. 33, l. 13)

The boat was never seen engaging in any activity connected with narcotics or dangerous drugs or the smuggling of any type of merchandise (R.T., p. 39, l. 22). In fact, the boat was never seen outside of San Diego Harbor, nor was there ever any information that the boat actually left the harbor (R.T., p. 39, l. 1 and R.T., p. 43, l. 8) or the continental territory of the United States (R.T., p. 43, l. 23).

Agent Burnett testified that both the slip where the boat was docked and the "J" Street ramp where the boat was subsequently seized are in San Diego Bay, and further that it is not necessary to leave the United States to go from one to the other. (R.T., p. 45, l. 8)

Southern California is a most popular boating area, (R.T., p. 40, l. 11) with tens of thousands of privately owned pleasure boats. At approximately 7:00 P.M. on August 3, 1974, Agent Burnett noticed petitioner's boat was gone from its slip at the Marina. He then sent agents to the Lemon Street address in La Mesa to watch the Chevrolet Blazer and trailer. At approximately 11:00 P.M., the Blazer and trailer left the La Mesa address and went to a "J" Street launching ramp in Chula Vista, adjacent to San Diego Bay. The Blazer and trailer circled two or three times and then left and drove around Chula Vista before returning to the ramp. Shortly thereafter, the Blazer and trailer returned to the La Mesa address. (R. T., p. 12, l. 18)

Sometime after 12:00 midnight, August 6, 1974, petitioner's boat arrived at the "J" Street ramp (R.T., p. 3, l. 4) with two individuals aboard. One remained on board while the other walked up "J" Street to a telephone booth on Broadway, made a phone call and started to return to the boat. (R.T., p. 15, l. 12)

The Blazer and trailer arrived at the ramp while the telephone caller was walking back to the boat. At this time, the Blazer was being driven by petitioner Bordeaux. Prior to this time, petitioner had not been identified as the driver of the Blazer. (R.T., p. 46, l. 20)

The boat was loaded on the trailer and pulled partially out of the water. The trailer had a flat tire and the boat was started back towards the water when Agent Burnett ordered all co-defendants to cease further activity. (R.T., p. 16, l. 20)

Petitioner Bordeaux was never seen aboard the boat by either Agent Burnett or any other agent. In fact, petitioner Bordeaux never left the vehicle until ordered to do so by the agents. (R.T., p. 51, l. 21) Agent Burnett was also satisfied that petitioner Bordeaux had not been outside the United States. (R.T., p. 52, l. 3) Petitioner Bordeaux was cooperative at all times in every way, never attempting to run or flee or take other evasive action. (R.T., p. 54, l. 2)

At no time did the customs agents have or seek an arrest or search warrant.

(R.T., p. 29, l. 1) A search of the boat was then conducted and revealed marijuana. (R.T., p. 17, l. 6)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I

The affirmation of a stop and detention based upon less than a founded suspicion is offensive to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and previous Supreme Court decisions.

The Supreme Court has made it clear that while evidence which would establish defendant's guilt at trial is not necessary in order to arrest or search, "common rumor or report, suspicion, or even strong reason to suspect" will not suffice. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court indicated that a stop and frisk based upon facts which would lead to a founded suspicion that criminal activity was being engaged in by the defendant was lawful. (See also Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 9th Circuit, 1966).

The Court of Appeals in United States v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229, 235 (9th Circuit, 1973), quoting People v. Henze, 253 C. App. 2d 986 (1967), required that officers have a "rational suspicion" that "some activity out of the ordinary is or has taken place" which, in some fashion, is connected with the subjects under scrutiny and which, in some manner, suggests that the activity was criminal.

Under the foregoing requirements, it is apparent that the affirmative

allegations on which the government relies does not warrant the belief that the defendant was engaged in an unlawful enterprise or that the boat contained illegal merchandise. Specific articulable facts that a crime was being committed were not the product of Agent Burnett's observations. On the contrary, the activity observed was consistent with innocent behavior. It is a well-established principle of law that where events are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, a detention based on those events is unlawful.

The fact that a new boat is being taken from the water at night is certainly not suspicious. New boats need servicing on a regular basis and the fact that Agent Burnett never saw the boat being taken from the water is more than likely due to the hours he was working--8:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. In addition, from his location, Agent Burnett could not observe the numerous ramps in San Diego Bay from which a boat could be removed from the Bay.

Agent Burnett also related the fact that he had run petitioner Bordeaux's name on the computer and obtained a "hit". However, Agent Burnett never made any effort to follow up this inquiry to ascertain the validity of this information or extent of involvement or nature of the crime, if any. In United States v. Williams, 459 F.2d 44 (9th Cir., 1972), the Court held that a computer report is only as good as the information supplied by the reporting officer. Here there was no effort to validate any of the computer information.

BLEED THROUGH

The activity which is set out in the Statement of Facts indicates activity which is clearly consistent with innocence and was not sufficient to establish a founded suspicion upon which to base a lawful detention. United States v. Majourau, 474 F.2d 766, (9th Cir., 1973). It appears that Agent Burnett acted on nothing more than the suspicion condemned in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).

It is essential that the Court grant the requested Writ in order to clarify an area of law certain to be challenged time and time again within all jurisdictions adjacent to international borders. The facts of this case will continue to be presented given our proximity to international borders, the tremendous number of pleasure boats within numerous jurisdictions and our continued grappling with the slippery "founded suspicion" standard. It is respectfully requested that a uniform and specific opinion of the Court dealing with "founded suspicion", particularly in similar "boat and airplane" cases, be decided to enable the lower courts to more easily and efficiently deal with such cases.

II

The stop and search of petitioner's vehicle cannot be justified as a valid border search and therefore is not within one of the delineated exceptions

to probable cause or warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

"Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347-357 (1967) and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).

The crossing of an international border is in and of itself an exigent circumstance allowing for warrantless searches to be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. However, this exception must be confined to its appropriate scope.

In Corngold v. United States, 376 F.2d 1 (9th Cir., 1966), the Court held that a statute containing broad delegation of authority to customs agents to search and seize imported merchandise could not be used to authorize a search which would otherwise be prohibited by constitutional provisions. "We have treated the outer limits of authority delegated by the statute as available only in border searches and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the search of appellant's package occurred in the course of an entry into this country."

To permit Title 19 USC Section 1581 (a) to authorize warrantless searches without the underlying justification for the original exception, namely, evidence of

international border crossing would be a serious departure from the reasoning of Corngold, supra.

The Almeida-Sanchez v. United United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), decision held that warrantless, random, roving stopping of automobiles by immigration officers in search of illegal aliens, not conducted at the international boundary or its functional equivalent or without probable cause, was a violation of an individual's rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. Although stopping short of declaring the statute under which the officers were operating unconstitutional, the Court did hold that it was unreasonably applied in regard to a search twenty miles from the border by agents who had no knowledge of any recent border crossing by the appellant or his vehicle. The language of the opinion eliminates the application of the statute except in cases where the search is conducted as the functional equivalent of a border search. Such warrantless searches of vehicles are unconstitutional unless conducted in such a manner as to be reasonably certain that virtually every vehicle searched will have just crossed the international border. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir., 1974). The same must be logically applied to the present situation if pleasure boat enthusiasts are to enjoy any semblance of Fourth Amendment protection from governmental intrusions.

The facts of this case state very clearly that Agent Burnett had no facts or reasonable justification to believe

that the boat had ever left San Diego Bay, both the rented marina slip on Shelter Island and the "J" Street ramp being located within San Diego Bay. Furthermore, there was no testimony in the instant case that the defendants were ever closer than seven miles from the border or that any of the individuals had recently crossed the border. Without evidence of such a border crossing, this detention and search removed from the border area cannot fall within the extended border search trilogy of Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir., 1966); United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir., 1970); and United States v. Markham, 440 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir., 1970). Therefore, to sustain this detention and search as a border search would be contrary to the principles of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, and would allow for wholesale violations of the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who frequent the many hundreds of pleasure boat basins which dot our coastline.

The government cannot attempt to justify the search herein by custom agents as anything but a border search because U.S. Customs Agents do not have general police jurisdiction. The court in U.S. v. Majourau, supra, citing U.S. v. Jackson, 423 F.2d 506 (9th Cir., 1970) said:

> "Moreover, customs agents 'are not, like local or state police, general guardians of the public peace.' They are customs agents, with duties and powers limited to activities

of the type that the title implies."

It is imperative then that a concise delineation of the power of the customs agents to conduct such searches be made by this Court so that our jurisdictions can effectively protect the Fourth Amendment rights of pleasure boaters and water enthusiasts.

III

The evidence in the instant case was insufficient to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner possessed marijuana with intent to distribute.

The cases are uniform in their finding that in order to support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), there must exist both knowledge of the contraband and dominion and control. In the present case, the government failed to show either dominion and control or knowledge of the contraband by petitioner, and unless mere conjecture is used, there are no facts to supply either.

The facts as related by Agent Burnett establish that a boat was registered to Jerry James Bordeaux, and a trailer was being pulled by a vehicle registered to Willford and Elizabeth

Bordeaux, both registered to the same address.

There is no other evidence to connect Jerry James Bordeaux with the boat on the day of its seizure. He was never seen on it, or even near it, other than at the time of the arrest. The two individuals described on the boat and in the van fit the description of the co-defendants, who plead guilty, but the description does not fit petitioner, who is in his middle thirties.

At the time of the arrest, petitioner Bordeaux never got out of the vehicle until ordered to do so, never got on the boat, and he was totally cooperative at the time.

The government relied primarily on the theory of constructive possession to establish the charge, because it is clear that petitioner Bordeaux was not in actual possession of the boat, nor had he been aboard the boat.

This Court has consistently reversed the convictions of individuals who were mere passengers in vehicles in which narcotics were found. United States v. Gardner, 475 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir., 1973); United States v. Lacefield, 468 F.2d 170 (9th Cir., 1972); United States v. Thomas, 453 F.2d 141 (9th Cir., 1971); Bettis v. United States, 408 F.2d 563 (9th Cir., 1969); Doherty v. United States, 318 F.2d 719 (9th Cir., 1963); Gonzales v. United States, 301 F.2d 31 (9th Cir., 1962); Arnellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603 (9th Cir., 1962).

In the present case, petitioner Bordeaux was not even in the same vehicle (the boat) in which the contraband was located. Further, there is no way he could have seen into the boat while remaining in the Chevrolet Blazer.

As pointed out in Evans v. United States, 257 F.2d 121, 126 (9th Cir., 1958), speculation, like suspicion, is not proof and may not be inferred from mere associations. Evans v. United States, supra; Ong Way Jong v. United States, 245 F.2d 392 (9th Cir., 1957).

Mere presence in the area where narcotics is discovered or mere association with persons controlling the location of drugs or property is insufficient to support a finding of possession. United States v. Martin, 483 F.2d 974.

Considering the tremendous number of similar cases involving suspects arrested within close proxinity to contraband, it would be of national importance for this Court to enunciate the principles of "dominion and control" and sufficiency of evidence necessary to convict under said circumstances.



BLEED THROUGH

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner Jerry James Bordeaux respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the decision below.

Dated: [illegible]

Respectfully submitted,



PATRICK J. BRIGGS, ESQ.
HARRINGTON, WADDELL & BRIGGS
520 West Ash, Suite 300
San Diego, CA 92101
(714) 238-1355
Attorneys for Petitioner



DO NOT PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *Plaintiff-Appellee,* vs. JERRY JAMES BORDEAUX, *Defendant-Appellant.*	No. 75-2291 MEMORANDUM

[November 12, 1975]

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California

Before: HUFSTEDLER and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges,
and FERGUSON,* District Judge

The evidence before the district court was sufficient for its determination that customs officers had clear founded suspicion to stop and interrogate the defendant. The stop being lawful, the marijuana was in plain view and its seizure proper.

Affirmed.

*Honorable Warren J. Ferguson, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

PERNAU-WALSH PRINTING CO., SAN FRANCISCO 11-20-75 400

APPENDIX A

BLEED THROUGH

FILED
JAN 7 1976
PAUL P. O'BRIEN, JR. CLERK
U. S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY JAMES BORDEAUX, Defendant-Appellant.	No. 75-2291 ORDER

Before: [illegible]STEDLER and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and [illegible]RGUSON,* District Judge

The panel as constituted in the above case has voted to deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the suggestion for a rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for en banc rehearing, and no judge of the court has requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for a rehearing en banc is rejected.

Dated: January 7, 1976.

*Honorable Warren J. Ferguson, United States District Judge, Central District of California, sitting by designation.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-1108

JERRY JAMES BORDEAUX, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

Petitioner contends that the warrantless stop of a vehicle he was driving, and the subsequent seizure of marihuana from his boat on an attached trailer, were unreasonable and that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of the marihuana.

After a jury-waived trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, petitioner was convicted of possessing approximately 1,767 pounds of marihuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, to be followed by a special parole term of five years. The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. A).

Clyde Burnett, a United States Customs Patrol Officer, was assigned to patrol the boat docks, marinas, and harbor in the San Diego area during the summer months of 1974 (Tr. 5-6). Over a period of several weeks during that

period, his attention was attracted to a blue and white Sea Ray boat (Tr. 10, 25-26). He had seen the boat launched during daylight hours on several occasions but had never seen it taken out of the water. One day, after the boat was launched from a trailer, Burnett observed that the trailer and the vehicle to which it was attached proceeded to a nearby marina. The person driving the boat tied it up at one of the slips at the marina and then entered the vehicle pulling the trailer (Tr. 6-7). Burnett ascertained that the boat had a permanent berth at the marina (*ibid.*). These facts indicated to Burnett that, although the boat was being launched during the day, it was being taken out of the water late at night (Tr. 6).

A registration check on the boat revealed that petitioner was its registered and legal owner. A check on petitioner through the Customs computer indicated that he had previously been involved with marihuana or other narcotics in Arizona (Tr. 8-9, 31-33).

A Chevrolet Blazer was the only vehicle ever seen pulling the boat and trailer (Tr. 38). The Blazer was registered to Wilfred and Elizabeth Bordeaux at petitioner's address (Tr. 35-36). Burnett checked this address five or six times over a period of several weeks but never saw the boat or Blazer there (Tr. 8, 24, 36-37). On one occasion, the Blazer and trailer were followed from the launching area to an address on Lemon Street in La Mesa, California (Tr. 11).

On August 5, 1974, the boat was missing from its berth at about 7:00 P.M. (Tr. 10, 41). Burnett and other customs officers established surveillance at the La Mesa residence and at a ramp on J Street in Chula Vista where the Blazer and trailer had previously been seen. At about 11:00 P.M., Burnett was informed by radio that the Blazer and trailer were leaving the La Mesa address and were

BLEED THROUGH

proceeding toward the ramp. The Blazer circled the ramp area and then left and drove aimlessly around Chula Vista; it returned to the ramp area about 20 minutes later (Tr. 10-12, 41-42, 46). The Blazer waited for a short while at the ramp, circled the area, and again left and drove around Chula Vista, returning to the ramp a third time at about 1:00 A.M. (Tr. 12, 47-49). The boat still was not at the ramp. The Blazer thereupon left the area and returned to the La Mesa address (Tr. 12).

Shortly after the Blazer returned to the La Mesa address, the boat arrived at the ramp with co-defendants Spencer and Christopher aboard (Tr. 13, 50-51). The agents saw Spencer leaving the area and going to a public phone booth. Immediately after Spencer left the phone booth, Burnett was informed that the Blazer and boat trailer were leaving the La Mesa residence. The Blazer, driven by petitioner (Tr. 15), proceeded directly to the J Street ramp (Tr. 13, 51). Burnett was informed by his fellow officers that the boat was coming up out of the water and was at the top of the ramp (Tr. 15). Burnett started to move toward the ramp. He was then informed that the boat was being moved back down toward the water (Tr. 15-16). As he approached the vehicles, Burnett saw them going into the water. He noticed that the tires on the trailer were low and that one was flat, indicating to him that the boat was heavily loaded (Tr. 16, 54). When Burnett became aware that the boat was moving toward the water, he believed that the individuals involved had discovered the surveillance and were trying to escape. Burnett pulled up alongside the Blazer and ordered petitioner to stop (Tr. 18). Burnett observed no recreational equipment or fish in the boat (Tr. 54-55).

When the other officers arrived at the scene, Burnett got out of his vehicle and walked back to the boat and trailer (Tr. 17). The top of the boat was about five feet from the

ground (Tr. 52). Burnett could see marihuana in plain view underneath some canvas when he looked over the side (gunnels) of the boat without moving the canvas (Tr. 17). A subsequent search of the boat revealed the marihuana that was the basis of petitioner's conviction.

1. Petitioner contends that the stop of his boat and the subsequent seizure of the marihuana were unlawful because the customs officers did not have a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity justifying the stop. That factual contention was correctly resolved against petitioner by both courts below. As the court of appeals held (Pet. App. A):

> The evidence before the district court was sufficient for its determination that customs officers had clear founded suspicion to stop and interrogate the defendant. The stop being lawful, the marihuana was in plain view and its seizure proper.

Petitioner does not challenge the correctness of the "founded suspicion" standard. See *United States* v. *Brignoni-Ponce*, 422 U.S. 873. His argument is that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the standard was satisfied on the facts of this case. The evidence as summarized above, however, clearly supports the court of appeals' ruling, and the issue does not warrant further review.

2. Petitioner contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was in possession of the marihuana. The contraband was found in a boat registered to petitioner, and the boat was on a trailer hitched to a vehicle that petitioner was driving. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, *Glasser* v. *United States*, 315 U.S. 60, 80, it was ample to support a finding by the trier of fact that petitioner had constructive possession of the marihuana.

BLEED THROUGH

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

ROBERT H. BORK,
Solicitor General.

APRIL 1976.